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Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from 
Brazil 
 
By FRANCESCO CASELLI AND GUY MICHAELS* 
We use variation in oil output among Brazilian municipalities to 
investigate the effects of resource windfalls on government 
behaviour. Oil-rich municipalities experience increases in revenues 
and report corresponding increases in spending on public goods 
and services. However, survey data and administrative records 
indicate that social transfers, public good provision, infrastructure, 
and household income increase less (if at all) than one might expect 
given the higher reported spending.   
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Should communities that discover oil in their subsoil or off their coast, rejoice 
or mourn? Should citizens be thrilled or worried when their governments receive 
fiscal windfalls? Ample anecdotal evidence on both questions has, over the years, 
shaken many economists’ confidence that the answer is as obvious as it might 
seem at first brush. Oil, like many other natural resources, has been variously 
described as a source of “disease” or even, by some, as a “curse,” bringing 
adverse changes in relative prices, corruption, rent seeking, and other ills that 
result in the dissipation of most possible benefits – if not in extreme cases in an 
outright decline in living standards. Other types of fiscal windfall, such as 
international aid or – in the case of local government – transfers from the central 
government, also often stand accused of creating similar problems.  
To provide systematic empirical evidence on some of these issues we study 
the effects of an offshore oil-induced fiscal windfall among Brazilian 
municipalities. Offshore oil endowments and production vary widely within 
Brazil, and we argue that conditional on a few geographic controls this variation 
is exogenous to municipal characteristics. Furthermore, oil-producing 
municipalities are entitled to royalties, so we can investigate the consequences of 
oil-related revenues for the public provision of goods and services and living 
standards. Because offshore-oil windfalls accrue exclusively to municipalities that 
are situated on the Atlantic coast, we compare outcomes in offshore-oil endowed 
municipalities to outcomes in other coastal municipalities. 
We begin the paper by documenting that municipal revenues increase 
significantly with oil production, and that the bulk of this increase is accounted 
for by royalties. Evidently, royalty payments are not undone by offsetting changes 
in other transfers from the state or federal governments (or by tax cuts). The 
revenue-side expansion is matched by a corresponding increase in the 
expenditure-side of the budget. Municipalities that receive oil windfalls report 
significant increases in spending on a variety of public goods and services, such 
as housing and urban infrastructure, education, health, and transportation, and in 
transfers to households. 
Given the significant expansion in reported spending, one would expect 
sizable improvements in welfare-relevant outcomes for the local population. We 
therefore look at measures of housing quality and quantity, supply of educational 
and health inputs, road infrastructure, and welfare receipts. The results paint a 
complex picture, with no apparent changes in some areas, small improvements in 
some others, and small worsening in others yet. On balance, however, the data 
appear to suggest that the actual flow of goods, services, and transfers to the 
population is not commensurate with the reported spending increases stemming 
from the windfall, a shortfall that we dub “missing money.” To confirm that the 
windfall does not trickle down to the population through other channels we look 
at household income, and find only minimal improvements. We also show that 
oil-rich municipalities did not experience a differential increase in population. 
This implies that our results are not driven by a dilution of the benefits of oil 
abundance. Furthermore, the fact that people do not flock to oil-abundant 
communities reinforces our message that oil abundance has not been seen as 
particularly beneficial by the population. 
Our finding that oil windfalls translate into little improvement in the provision 
of public goods or the population’s living standards raises an important question: 
where are the oil revenues going? We cannot pin down the answer to this question 
conclusively, but we argue that circumstantial evidence points to a combination of 
patronage/rent sharing and embezzlement by top municipal officials. 
 There is a growing empirical literature attempting to provide systematic 
statistical evidence on the effects of resource abundance and other fiscal 
windfalls, particularly international aid. The near totality of this work focuses on 
comparisons between countries.1 Using variation within Brazil allows us to 
circumvent some of the well-known limitations of this approach.  First, many of 
 
1
 The “classic” cross-country study on the effect of natural resources is Sachs and Warner (1997), which has spawned a 
large literature. On foreign aid see, e.g., Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and the references there. 
the institutional, cultural, and policy variables that potentially confound the cross-
country relationship between resources (and aid) and outcomes are held constant, 
enhancing our ability to make inference. In addition, as we detail below, we can 
make plausible claims of exogeneity for our measure of resource abundance. This 
is rarely the case in cross-country work where typically resource abundance is 
measured in terms of resource exports (an outcome variable). Finally, we are able 
to focus on one specific channel of causation: the one operating through the 
change in the amount of public goods and services brought about by the fiscal 
windfall. Of course, these benefits also imply a limitation: our analysis is silent on 
other possible channels through which resource abundance affects local socio-
economic outcomes. Nevertheless, as we review below, most recent work on 
natural resources is centered on the way resource windfalls reverberates through 
the political process, so our focus is germane to an issue that has raised much 
concern.  
A few recent studies have tried, like ours, to move beyond the cross-country 
correlations and examine resource discoveries using within-country regional 
variation (Aragon and Rud 2009, Michaels 2011, Naritomi, Soares, and Assuncao 
2007, Bobonis and Morrow 2010). None of these focus on the fiscal windfall 
associated with a resource boom. Vicente (2010) compares changes in perceived 
corruption in Sao Tome (which recently found oil) with Cape Verde (which 
didn’t), and finds large increases in corruption following the oil discovery. On 
fiscal windfalls, the closest contribution is Litschig’s (2008) study of federal 
transfers to Brazilian municipalities, exploiting discontinuities in the transfer-
allocation rule. He finds that these windfalls translate into increased educational 
spending and gains in schooling.2 
 
2
 Very recently there have been new contributions by Brollo et al. (2010), exploiting the same discontinuity as Litschig 
to look at corruption outcomes, and Monteiro and Ferraz (2010), who study the effects of oil royalties on political 
outcomes in Brazilian municipalities, as we further discuss in Section IV. Other related work is the discovery by Reinikka 
 I. Oil in Brazil: A Brief Overview 
Figure 1 presents a summary of the pace and timing of oil discoveries in 
Brazil. 3 Meaningful onshore oil discovery began in the 1940s, and the number of 
finds peaked in the 1980s. Successful onshore prospecting activity has since 
dwindled. Offshore oil prospecting is a much more recent phenomenon, with 
finds growing rapidly from almost nothing in the early 1970s, to a peak in the 
1980s. Subsequently, there has been a marked decline in the 1990s, and a 
significant pick up in the 2000s – the latter not reflected in the figure because the 
big finds have occurred very recently. For our purposes, the important take away 
from the figure is that offshore oil is for all practical purposes a post-1970 
development. This is important because later on we show that in 1970 
(subsequently) oil-rich municipalities looked indistinguishable from 
municipalities that did not discover oil later in the century (conditional on 
appropriate controls). 
As of 2005, the Brazilian oil sector accounted for approximately 2% of world 
oil production, 1% of world oil reserves, and 2% of Brazilian GDP. (All of these 
figures will rise significantly in years to come). Offshore oil accounts for the vast 
majority of output. Oil in Brazil is inextricably linked to Petrobras, the oil 
multinational controlled by the Federal Government, which completely dominates 
the industry. Given the essentially monopolistic structure of the industry, the oil 
sector is heavily regulated. The industry regulator is Agência Nacional do 
                                                                                                                                     
and Svensson (2004) that the vast majority of public funds due to Ugandan primary schools never reach the intended 
recipients, which is reminiscent of our “missing money” result, and the “missing imports”  finding of Fisman and Wei’s 
(2004). Golden and Picci (2005) also present a related measure based on the difference between physical quantities and 
prices paid by government. The literature on the effects of transfers from central to local governments is, of course, very 
large, and to the extent that such transfers represent fiscal windfalls our paper relates to this entire line of research. Much of 
this literature focuses on the possibility of a “flypaper effect,” whereby local public expenditure appears more elastic to 
federal transfers than to (local) tax revenues [e.g. Hines and Thaler (1995) for a review.] 
3
 Throughout the paper we use “oil” as a shorthand for “oil and (natural) gas.” Oil accounts for about 90% of the value 
of output of the oil and gas sector. 
Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP). One of the many important 
functions of ANP is to oversee the calculation of royalties due on each oilfield, 
collect the payment, and distribute it to the various recipients. In Unpublished 
Appendix 1 we give a detailed description of the (very complicated) rules for the 
allocation of royalties. Here we summarize the main points. 
Federal law mandates that Petrobras pay close to 10% of the value of the gross 
output from its oilfields in the form of royalties. The recipients of royalties 
include: some federal entities, state governments, and municipal governments, the 
latter two both directly, and indirectly through the division of a “special fund” 
into which some of the royalties are paid. Municipal governments are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of about 30% of the royalty pie, i.e. roughly 3% of the value of gross 
oil output. This can result in substantial royalty revenues for some municipalities: 
in the top 25 municipalities by per capita oil output, royalties accounted for about 
30% of municipal revenues in 2000. 
A municipality’s royalty income depends on several factors. Some of these 
factors are purely geographic, and we discuss them in greater detail below. Other 
determinants of royalty participation, however, are not geographic. For example, 
municipalities on whose territory is located infrastructure for the storage and 
transportation of oil and gas or for the landing of offshore oil, or are even only 
“affected” by such operations, are also entitled to some. Furthermore, some 
components of the royalty allocation scheme depend on the size of the 
municipality’s population. For these reasons, royalty income is not a credible 
exogenous measure of the windfall received by municipalities due to oil. This 
consideration plays an important role in our identification strategy, which we 
discuss below.  
Another source of “Petro-Reais” for oil-producing municipalities is the 
“Special Participation” (not to be confused with the “Special Fund” mentioned 
above), a tax on oilfield output – a royalty in all but name – part of which, once 
again, is given out to municipalities bearing a close geographic relationship with 
the corresponding oilfields. The overall value of the “Partecipacao Especial” is 
similar to the overall value of royalties. For example, in 2004 royalties amounted 
to R$5735 Millions, while the Partecipacao was R$5995 Millions. However, 
royalties are more important to producing/facing municipalities, which receive 
between 20 and 30% of the royalties while municipalities but only about 10% of 
the “Participacao” (de Oliveira Cruz and Ribeiro 2008 and Mendes et al. 2008). 
 
II. Specification, Data, and Identification 
A. Specification 
Our units of analysis are Brazilian áreas mínimas comparáveis (AMCs), 
statistical constructs slightly larger than municipalities, for which we have 
detailed outcome variables (see data section). The main results of the paper are 
from instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the following model: 
 (1) Wm = δ + θ Rm + ρ Xm + um,  
 
where Wm is a set of AMC outcomes, including reported spending on various 
municipal-budget outcomes, real provision of public goods and services, transfers, 
household income and poverty rates, etc.; Rm, is an AMC-level measure of 
municipal revenues, and Xm is a set of the following AMC-level geographic 
controls: latitude, longitude, an indicator for whether the AMC is on the coast, 
distances from federal and state capitals, a state capital dummy, and state fixed 
effects.  
The set of instruments is [Qm Xm], where Qm is a measure of AMC-level oil 
output. In other words we instrument municipal revenues by municipal oil output. 
The idea behind the instrumental-variable approach is to isolate the average effect 
of a Real of municipal revenue due to oil (a “Petro-Real”). For this interpretation 
to be legitimate, we need (i) Q to affect R, and (ii) Q to affect W only through its 
effect on R. That (i) is the case will be shown in Section IV.A, while the case of 
(ii) is made in Section III.C. The year in which the variables in (1) are observed 
varies slightly due to data-availability constraints, but in most cases it is the year 
2000. 
As a robustness check, we also report results from a first-difference 
specification: 
(2) ΔWm = δ + θ ΔRm + ρ Xm + um,  
 
where the instruments are again [Qm Xm]. The exact period over which we take 
first differences in (2) depends on availability of data on outcomes and municipal 
revenues, but in most cases it is 1991-2000 (i.e. between the last two censuses). 
Note that we only observe oil output in 1999 (and subsequent years). In 
instrumenting the change in revenues between two dates by oil output in the final 
date we are implicitly approximating the change in oil output by the final level. 
This is not a bad approximation as oil output in the early 1990s was much lower 
than in 2000, and so were oil prices. In any case this approximation probably only 
introduces measurement error in the instrument, and is thus  not a major concern 
for identification – as long as the first stage is strong. 
While we report the results from (2) for all our outcome variables, in the text we 
focus on the results for (1). There are three reasons for emphasizing the results in 
levels. First, as already discussed the instrument is a noisy measure of the change 
in oil output. Second, there are a few outcome variables for which we do not have 
baseline outcomes, so we can only run the level regressions. Third, as we discuss 
below, our data lend themselves more naturally to a test of random assignment of 
the oil for the level specification. Nevertheless, as the reader will see, the results 
using levels and first differences are very similar. 
As an alternative to specifications (1) and (2), in order to gauge the effects of 
oil-related revenues, we could have simply regressed the socio-economic 
outcomes we are interested in on the oil royalties received by AMCs, which we 
observe. However, as explained above, some of the factors determining a 
municipality’s share in the royalties are not purely geographic, implying that 
royalty income is potentially endogenous to other municipality-level outcomes. 
For example, local conditions correlated with our outcomes of interest may also 
affect whether a municipality hosts oil-transportation infrastructure, or the size of 
its population, both of which enter the royalty-allocation formula.   
 
 
B. Data 
Over the decades the number of Brazilian municipalities has increased, as 
many of them have split into two or more. There is some evidence that some of 
this splitting was a consequence of perverse incentives in the mechanism that 
assigns federal transfers to municipalities (transfers per capita are strongly 
decreasing in population size) [Brandt (2002)]. However, we are not able to rule 
out that part of this splitting process may have been driven by a desire to game the 
royalty-allocation system.  Furthermore, this fragmentation makes it difficult to 
test for random assignment of oil at the municipality level, as some of today’s 
municipalities did not exist twenty or more years ago.  
To deal with these problems, we work with data at the AMC level. AMCs are 
constructed by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), which is the 
source for much of our data. Each AMC contains one municipality (or more), and 
the area of each AMC remains relatively stable even when municipality 
boundaries change. The particular AMC partition we work on essentially 
reproduces municipality boundaries in 1970, i.e. before the process of offshore-oil 
discovery. It is therefore immune from the potential endogenous splitting 
problem. At the same time, since we observe values of the outcome variables in 
1970 at the AMC level, we are able to test for random assignment. Altogether, 
more than 5,500 municipalities that exist today are pooled into 3,659 AMCs. 
As already seen Brazil has both onshore and offshore oil. For reasons we 
discuss below, it is easier to argue that offshore oil production is exogenous for 
AMC outcomes than onshore oil production. Therefore, this paper focuses on the 
effects of offshore oil. The “treated” AMCs, therefore, will be those AMCs that 
have offshore oil and no onshore oil, as we explain shortly. By definition, treated 
AMCs are on the coast. In order to focus on a relatively similar control group, 
therefore, we will compare coastal AMCs with (only) offshore oil with coastal 
AMCs with no oil (of any kind). All our results, however, are robust to using 
alternative control groups, such as all non-oil AMCs that are adjacent to our 
treated AMCs, or indeed all non-oil Brazilian municipalities. We flag at the 
appropriate points the few occurrences where these results differed.4 
Many of the variables we use in the paper are directly available from IPEA at 
the AMC level. Others are available – or must be first constructed – at the 
municipal level. In these cases we collapse the municipal-level data to the AMC 
level using a cross-walk from IPEA. Most of the data we use is self-explanatory, 
so we relegate a detailed discussion of definitions, methods, and sources for most 
of them to Unpublished Appendix 2 (except for a few notes in the relevant parts 
of the main text). As a general rule, all variables measured in per-capita terms 
 
4
 Detailed results using all non-oil AMCs, instead of just the coastal ones, as control group are reported in the working 
paper version [Caselli and Michaels (2009)]. In that paper we also show that the results largely hold for municipalities that 
have onshore oil, but those results have been omitted here as the exogeneity of the oil windfall is less cleanly established 
than for offshore oil, as we discuss below. 
should be interpreted as the sum of the municipal aggregates divided by the sum 
of the municipal populations. All dummy variables take the value of one if they 
take the value of one in at least one of the municipalities in the AMC. Here we 
only give some of the details of our key instrument, which we constructed (with 
additional details in the unpublished appendix). 
Calculating the value of oil extracted in each AMC involves two steps: (i) 
build a dataset of oil output for each oilfield; (ii) allocate the oil output of each 
oilfield among municipalities according to an appropriate rule based on their 
mutual geographical relationship. Step (i) is relatively easy, as since 1999 ANP 
reports detailed price and production data for each oilfield. This gives us the value 
of oil produced each year in each oilfield from 1999 to 2005.  
For step (ii) we take advantage of the geographic component of the royalty-
allocation formula. As discussed, Petrobras pays royalties (through ANP) for oil 
extraction to municipal governments, and one component of the royalty allocation 
formula is based on the principle that a certain percentage of the value of the 
output of each offshore oilfield must be paid to the “municipalities facing the 
oilfields.” To implement this principle a mechanism had to be devised to 
determine for each oilfield which are the “facing” municipalities. The principle 
that has been followed according to Brazilian law apportions the royalties based 
on the fraction of the oilfield that lies within each municipality’s borders’ 
extension on the continental shelf. The resulting percentage allocation is collected 
in a document called “Percentuais Médios de Confrontação” or average shares of 
“facing,” i.e. shares of each municipality in an offshore oilfield based on the 
“facing” criterion. We use these shares to allocate oil output from each field to the 
various municipalities. We then sum over all the municipalities in each AMC and 
divide by the sum of municipal populations to obtain oil output per capita at the 
AMC level. 
Table 1 present summary statistics from the two key subsamples in our 
dataset. Column 1 reports figures calculated from the subsample formed by the 
156 coastal AMCs that do not have any kind of oilfield, whether onshore or 
offshore. The second column is based on the subsample of 31 AMCs that have 
offshore oil, but no onshore oil. As we discussed above, the AMCs with no oil are 
our “control group,” while the municipalities with “offshore only” oil are our 
“treatment group.” All our results, therefore, exclude AMCs with onshore oil.5 
Figure 2 shows a map of Brazil with AMC boundaries and oilfields. Appendix 
Table A1 reports summary statics for all the other variables used in our tables. 
There are clearly sizable differences in average GDP per capita, municipal 
revenues and population between oil-rich and oil-poor AMCs.6 These differences, 
however, are clearly not causal. For one thing, even among these coastal AMCs, 
the geographic variables also reported in the table show some systematic 
differences in the location of oil. To identify the causal effect of oil it is therefore 
important to control for these additional geographic characteristics. We also 
control for state fixed effects.  
The table also reports statistics from the distribution of our constructed 
measure of oil output per capita.7 It is important to keep in mind that our oil 
output measure corresponds to a gross output concept, so it is not directly 
comparable to the GDP numbers in the table. Nevertheless the following back-of-
the-envelope calculation can be used to get a sense of the importance of oil in oil-
rich municipalities. In the national accounts, value added in the oil sector is about 
40% of gross output. Applying that percent to the average gross output number in 
 
5
 There are 9 coastal AMCs that have both onshore and offshore oil, and 17 that have only onshore oil, so altogether 26 
coastal AMCs are dropped from the analysis. In order to establish whether a municipality has onshore oil we combined 
GIS data on the (terrestrial) boundaries of municipalities, with similar data on the boundaries of onshore oilfields. We then 
say that an AMC has onshore oil if any of its municipalities is located above (a portion of) an onshore oilfield. 
6
 To convert R$2000 to 2008 US dollars the appropriate conversion factor is roughly 1. Our reason for reporting GDP 
for 2002 (instead of 2000 as for the other variables) is discussed later. 
7
 We should point out that there are a few cases of zero oil output even among the “oil AMCs.” This is because the oil-
AMC dummy is constructed based on having a positive share in an oilfield that was operating in 2007 (see Appendix 2). 
Some of these fields were still in the development stage (or still undiscovered) in 2000.  
Table 1 we find that oil accounts for almost 20% of GDP in the offshore-only oil 
AMCs. Another important message from Table 1 is that there is massive variation 
in oil output within oil-rich subsamples, with the 90th, 95th , and 100th percentiles 
all being large multiples of the mean. This underscores that our identification of 
the effects of oil comes as much from within oil-rich variation as from variation 
between the no-oil and the oil-rich samples. 
Admittedly, our group of offshore-oil producers is quite a small sample, and 
the results are bound to depend on variation among a handful of AMCs. For 
example, the top two AMCs ranked by oil output per capita are critical to identify 
the effect of oil abundance on revenues, as can be seen from the scatterplot in 
Appendix Figure A1.8 While this is obviously not a problem conceptually (that’s 
where the variation is!), it is perhaps useful to note that all the main conclusions 
of the paper go through when using the full sample with all oil-producing AMCs, 
i.e. including onshore-oil producers (where the results are extremely robust to 
taking out subsets as large as the 10 top AMCs, again as measured by oil output 
per capita). These results are reported in detail in the working-paper version. 
 
C. Identification 
We begin the discussion of our identification assumptions by arguing that Qm 
is exogenous to local characteristics and local shocks. We start this argument by 
showing that a number of municipal-level outcomes did not differ in oil-rich and 
oil-poor AMCs before oil was discovered. As we have just seen, oil and non-oil 
AMCs differ somewhat in a number of geographical characteristics. This means 
 
8
 The top two AMCs by oil output include the municipalities of Rio das Ostras, Casimiro de Abreu, Macaé, Quissamã, 
and Carapebus, all of which are well-known large royalty recipients. When they are simultaneously omitted from the 
offshore-only sample, the point estimates do not change very much but the standard errors increase massively. When 
AMCs are dropped one at a time all the results in the paper are robust.  
that oil is potentially spuriously correlated with other covariates. But our claim is 
that oil is as good as randomly assigned conditional on geographic covariates 
(state fixed effects, longitude, latitude, distance to federal capital, distance to state 
capital, state-capital dummies, and coastal dummies). In other words, once we 
compare oil and non-oil AMCs with similar geographic characteristics, oil-
abundance is random.  
To establish conditional random assignment we relate pre-discovery socio-
economic outcomes to subsequent oil abundance, as measured by oil output in 
2000. Table 2 shows results from cross-sectional regressions of the following 
form: 
(3) Ym,1970 = δ + η Qm,2000 + θ Xm + wm,  
 
where Ym,1970 is a socio-economic outcome in AMC m in 1970, and Qm,2000 is 
oil output per capita in AMC m in the year 2000.  
Our main reason for focusing on 1970 for our falsification test is that going 
back before 1970 would significantly reduce the number of AMCs, due to 
boundary changes during and before the 1960s. In addition, for some of the 
outcomes (particularly those related to housing – an important variable for us) the 
data are not available before 1970, irrespective of the level of AMC aggregation.  
On the other hand, nearly all of the offshore discoveries were made after 1970, so 
not much is lost by not presenting results for the pre-1970 period. 
It is quite clear that most socio-economic outcomes in 1970 do not vary 
systematically with the quantity of oil that will later be produced in coastal 
AMCs. This is true for years of schooling, literacy rates, residential capital stocks, 
electricity connections, sewage and drinking water (again, we discuss these 
variables in more detail below). The only exception is GDP per capita, which is 
slightly lower in oil-rich-to-be AMCs in the OLS specification.9 In order to check 
for the overall significance of these outcomes differences in the last column of the 
table we perform a “family-of-outcomes” test (Leibman et al. 2007 and Beaman 
et al. 2009), which is insignificant This is strongly indicative that, conditional on 
our covariates, AMCs did not differ from each other in a way that was correlated 
with their subsequent oil production.Table 2 shows that conditional on the 
geographic covariates, oil output per capita in 2000 is generally uncorrelated with 
various socio-economic outcomes in 1970. This in itself goes a long way in 
providing support for the identification of models (1) and (2). However, even if 
initial conditions were invariant to the oil abundance (and to 2000 oil output), one 
could in principle still be concerned that among oil AMCs the quantity of oil 
extracted, say, in 2000 is endogenous to other AMC-level shocks occurring after 
discovery. Similarly, one could be concerned that prospecting decisions and 
discovery events after 1970 could have been influenced by shocks occurring after 
1970. 
We argue that this is implausible. Oilfield operations in Brazil over the sample 
period were carried out by Petrobras, a global hydrocarbon giant with access to 
global factor and product markets. Neither its highly specialized equipment, nor 
its equally-specialized labor force could realistically be expected to be drawn 
locally, so local factor prices should not be a consideration. The oil fields are 
operated through gigantic rigs located many miles away from the coast, and hence from 
the municipalities that receive the revenue windfall. These rigs are supplied by large 
ships (and helicopters) that travel to/from a handful of large ports, typically pre-dating the 
oil discoveries, and certainly not necessarily from the “facing” municipalities that receive 
the royalties. Production may vary over time due to fluctuations in oil prices and/or in the 
 
9
 The coefficient estimate implies that for every peso worth of oil extracted in 2000 the AMC’s 1970 GDP was lower 
by 3 cents. The construction of the GDP numbers (both aggregate and sectoral) appears to be based mainly on firm- and 
consumer surveys as well as on tax returns. A description of the principles underlying the construction of these numbers 
can be found in IBGE (2008). 
prices of some inputs, but none of the inputs are sourced from the “facing” 
municipalities. At a point in time, variation across municipalities in our measure of oil 
output must be overwhelmingly driven by the size of the oilfield, the technical difficulty 
of extracting the oil in that particular location, and the share of the oilfield that is 
“captured” by the continental-shelf extension of the municipal boundaries.  
Another possible concern is that municipalities compete to lobby and/or bribe 
Petrobras to drill near them, or to influence the amount of oil extracted in a given 
location. However, municipalities are tiny and do not have the political heft and 
financial resources to sway the decisions of Petrobras, one of the World’s biggest 
companies. It is interesting in this respect that in a regression predicting oil output 
in 2000 with longitude, latitude, coast dummy, distances from state and federal 
capital, and a state-capital dummy (and state fixed effects) distance from state 
capital has a significant positive coefficient (p-value 0.04) while the state-capital 
dummy has a (borderline significant) negative coefficient (p-value 0.11) – a result 
that is hardly consistent with the view that oil output is affected by political 
influence (distance from federal capital is insignificant. Results available on 
request).10 Second, unlike many Brazilian institutions, Petrobras actually has a 
strong record and reputation for integrity – at least in recent years. This record has 
been explicitly recognized by international NGOs operating in the natural-
resource area, e.g. Transparency International (2008).  
Even if oil deposits are randomly assigned, and oil production is exogenous to 
local considerations, we still need to argue that oil output affects outcomes of 
interest (mainly spending by the local government, provision of public goods, 
services, and transfers, and household income) only through the revenues it 
generates for the municipality. Support for this claim is based on showing that oil 
 
10
 One issue that is definitely not a concern is the positioning of oil rigs conditional on exploitation of a certain oil 
field. Suppose that Petrobras can choose to pump oil out of an oilfield that “belongs” (according to the confrontacao 
formula) to two different AMCs. In this case it does not matter whether Petrobras pumps out the oil from the part of the 
field that belongs to one AMC or the other. Either way the AMCs will get the same share of the oil.  
production has little or no effect on non-oil economic activity, as measured by 
non-oil GDP. To show this, we present in Table 3 results from the following 
specification: 
 (4) Ym,2002 = δ + η Qm,2002 + θ Xm + wm,  
 
where Ym,2002 is GDP in 2002, Qm,2002 is oil output in the same year, and Xm is 
the usual set of geographic controls.11 
In interpreting the coefficients in Table 3 it is important to recall that the right-
hand-side variable, oil output, is a measure of gross output, while the left-hand-
side, municipal GDP, is a measure of value-added. Consider what this implies, for 
example, for the regression in column 1, where the dependent variable is 
aggregate AMC GDP and the coefficient on oil output is approximately 0.4. 
Because aggregate GDP is the sum of oil and non-oil GDP, R$0.4 is the sum of 
the direct effect of R$1 worth of oil extracted on oil GDP and its indirect (or 
spillover) effect on non-oil GDP. Now as already mentioned at the national level 
the share of oil GDP in gross oil output is also fairly stable and around 0.4. Under 
fairly standard assumptions average and marginal shares of GDP in gross output 
are the same, so to the extent that the national numbers are representative of local 
production relations the results in column 1 are prima facie evidence that oil 
production has little if any (positive or negative) spillovers on non-oil economic 
 
11
 We estimate (4) for the year 2002 because our measure of GDP in oil-abundant municipalities experiences a 
dramatic discrete drop between 2001 and 2002. An investigation of the data-construction measures behind the IPEA 
figures reveals that up to 2001 inputs into oil extraction were misattributed to the AMC where operations headquarters 
were located, rather than – correctly – to the AMC were the extraction took place. This mistake resulted in a vast 
overestimate of oil GDP at the AMC level, because it essentially amounted to using gross oil output to measure oil GDP. 
Needless to say, the overestimate of oil GDP carried over to aggregate AMC GDP, which was thus also grossly 
overestimated. The year 2002 is the first year for which this mistake was removed. This mismeasurement does not 
invalidate the falsification exercise we conducted in Table 2. The point of that exercise was to show that differences among 
municipalities were not systematically related to oil abundance before (and for several years after) the oil discoveries. 
Inflation in oil GDP numbers in oil-rich municipalities would only work against our case, by tending to make the effect of 
oil to seem to “kick-in” earlier than it did. 
activity.12 
We also have AMC-level GDP numbers disaggregated into industrial 
(manufacturing, construction, extraction industries, and utilities) and non-
industrial (agriculture, government, and services) GDP. In columns 2 and 3 we 
look at the effects of gross oil extraction on these two subaggregates. Since oil 
GDP is part of industrial GDP, column 2 has much the same interpretation as 
column 1, and since coefficients are still stable and close to 0.4 they suggest that 
in the typical oil-rich AMC oil production has little if any spillovers on other 
industrial subsectors. Similarly, column 3 shows essentially no spillovers from oil 
to the service sector. This last result is important because in this case the no-
spillover conclusion does not rest on an (admittedly uncertain) estimate of the 
share of oil GDP in gross oil output, as is the case for aggregate GDP or industrial 
GDP. Hence, for AMCs with offshore oil only, oil seems to have no market 
effects on economic activity. We infer that any effect from oil likely arises from 
the revenues it brings to the municipal government, making this the ideal control 
group to study the effects of oil-related fiscal windfalls on the provision of public 
goods and services.13 
One last issue relevant to identification is the role of population flows. Since 
our outcome variables are per capita, and since for many of the outcomes we tend 
to find little if any positive welfare effect from oil abundance, one possible 
concern is that oil discoveries in a certain locale attract migratory flows which 
 
12
 In formulas, begin by the identity GDP = NON-OIL GDP + OIL GDP. From column 1 we have d(NON-OIL 
GDP)/d(Gross oil output) + d(OIL GDP)/d(Gross oil output)  ≈ 0.4. From data at the national level d(OIL GDP)/d(Gross 
oil output)  ≈ 0.4 So that d(NON-OIL GDP)/d(Gross oil output)  ≈ 0. Needless to say, it would have been cleaner to simply 
obtain a measure of non-oil GDP and regress it on oil output. Regrettably, despite numerous attempts, we have been unable 
to obtain the figures used by IBGE for oil GDP, so we cannot net it out of aggregate GDP to obtain non-oil GDP. We do 
know that oil GDP at the municipal level is computed by distributing Petrobras value added according to a geographical 
formula similar to the one used by ANP to allocate (the geographical component of) royalties to municipalities [IBGE 
(2008) and e-mail exchanges with IBGE staff]. 
13
 In results reported in the working-paper version of this paper, we found some evidence that onshore oil changes 
somewhat the composition of non-oil GDP: industrial value added drops slightly, while non-industry value added 
increases. These results are one of the reasons why in this paper we focus on the AMCs with offshore oil only as our 
treatment group. 
dilute the benefits on a per-capita basis. Appendix Table A2 shows that there is no 
significant effect of oil on population, so our conclusions below are probably not 
driven by changes in the denominator. Moreover, the fact that people do not flock 
to oil-rich municipalities foreshadows the main result we discuss in the next 
section, namely that the benefits of oil windfalls to the population at large are 
limited. 
 
 
III. Results 
A. Oil Abundance and the Local Government Budget - Revenues 
We begin by confirming that oil brings revenues to Brazilian municipalities. 
Column 1 of Table 4 focuses on the cross-sectional relation between oil output 
and revenues in the year 2000. The coefficient implies that one Real of gross oil 
output increases total local-government revenues by almost exactly 3 cents.14 One 
shortcoming of the results in column 1 is that there are missing values for 
municipal revenue in 2000 for about 18 percent of the AMCs. In column 2 we use 
2001 values to impute the missing observations for 2000 (so we are now missing 
only about 6 percent of AMCs), with no change in results.  
In column 3 we investigate the sources of the increase in revenues, by looking 
at the effect of oil production on royalty income. The increase in royalty income 
accounts for 53% of the overall increase in municipality income due to oil 
production. The bulk of the remaining 47% is almost-certainly accounted for by 
the “Special Participation,” discussed in Section I. 
Column 4 shows a specification in semi-differences, i.e. with the 1991-2000 
 
14
 Throughout the paper we use “cent” for “Centavos,” or one hundredth of a Real. 
change in revenues regressed on 2000 oil output – which, for reasons discussed 
above, is also a reasonable proxy for the change in oil output. The coefficient is 
very close to the coefficient in the level regression for 2000. Note that column 2 is 
essentially the first stage for our main IV estimates of specification (1), and 
column 4 is the first stage for specification (2). 
One implication of Table 4 is that the money received from oil operations is 
not offset by a reduction in federal government transfers to the local government. 
Indeed, the fact that the increase in revenues is larger than the royalties suggests 
that there is not even a partial offset. Similarly, since revenues increase 
substantially, it does not seem that municipal governments take advantage of 
royalty income to cut local taxes.15 
 
B Oil Abundance and the Local Government Budget - Spending 
So oil brings money to the local government. What does the local government 
do with it? We begin in Table 5 with what the local government says it does, by 
looking at the effect of oil on reported spending. To establish a baseline, the first 
row of the top panel shows simple OLS regressions of spending on some of the 
functions that account for the largest shares of the average municipality budget on 
total revenues. The most important items are Education and Culture, on which 
municipalities report spending about 22 cents of each Real that comes into their 
coffers, and Health and Sanitation and Housing and Urban Development, each of 
which receives about 10 cents on the Real. Transportation and Transfers to 
 
15
 And as we would expect, a regression of local tax revenues per capita on municipal revenues per capita, 
instrumented as usual by oil output per capita (with all variables measured in 2000), and with our usual controls, yields a 
coefficient of -.035 with a standard error of .031. 
Households also receive significant shares of spending by function.16 Overall, 
total reported spending accounts for about 80 cents of every Real of revenue, 
consistent with the fact that Brazilian aggregate municipal statistics show a 
surplus for 2000. 
The OLS results, here and in the following tables, do not necessarily identify a 
causal effect, as municipal revenues are potentially endogenous to reported 
municipal spending. Such a bias, if present, would be likely to be positive, as 
municipalities that report larger spending will need to attract more federal 
transfers and/or raise more taxes. Even if they could be interpreted causally, the 
OLS coefficients would describe the allocation of revenue independent of its 
source, not the effect of oil-related revenues.17  
In order to causally identify the reported utilization of oil-related revenues, in 
Panel B we turn to our empirical model (1), where municipal revenues are 
instrumented for by oil output. In other words, we treat the regressions in Table 4 
as first-stage regressions in a two-stage least-square estimation of the effect of 
increases in revenues on spending. Our IV results show that the largest reported 
beneficiary of the increase in government revenues from oil is Housing and Urban 
Development, with about 18 cents of the marginal “oil Real.” Education and 
Transportation share second place, with, respectively, 14 and 13 cents. Health 
receives about 10 cents, and Transfers to households 5 cents.  
Note that the differences between the IV and OLS results are neither 
statistically significant nor systematic: sometimes the OLS coefficients are larger, 
 
16
 Education spending by municipal governments is mostly in the area of primary schooling. Health spending includes 
local clinics and hospitals. Housing comprises the planning, development and construction of housing in both rural and 
urban areas. Urban Development includes urban infrastructure. Transfers to households include “Social Assistance” (to the 
aged, to the handicapped, to children and communities) and “Social Security.” We do not have the year 2000 breakdown of 
these two items but in 2004 (and subsequently) the latter accounted for about 2/3 of the total. Nevertheless, social security 
is probably fairly tightly linked to retirement patterns, and hence to the demographic structure of the AMC’s population. 
Hence, we conjecture that social assistance is more discretionary and hence the relevant component at the margin. 
17
 Another possible source of bias is measurement error, but this is unlikely to be a major issue, as we are using 
administrative data. 
and sometimes they are smaller. Importantly, however, the coefficient on total 
spending is very similar. As discussed above, endogeneity bias would lead us to 
expect the OLS coefficients to be systematically larger than the IV ones, 
especially for total spending. Hence, we are somewhat inclined to favor a causal 
interpretation of the OLS coefficients. Under this interpretation, differences in 
OLS and IV results capture differences in in the effects of general revenues vs. 
oil-related revenues. We return to this distinction in the discussion at the end of 
the paper. 
 
C. Oil Abundance and Public-Service Provision 
Table 5 shows that oil-related revenues feed increased reported spending on 
housing and urban services, transportation, education, health, sanitation, and 
transfers to households. The purpose of this section is to look at a variety of 
measures of real outcomes in all of these areas, to see to what extent the increased 
reported spending leads to material improvements in living standards. 
Table 6 looks at a variety of housing, urban service and infrastructure 
outcomes: overall value of the residential housing stock, a proxy for housing 
quantity (rooms per person) and measures of quality of housing and infrastructure, 
namely the fraction of the population living in favelas, connection to electricity, 
water and sewage networks, piping, garbage collection, and extent of roads under 
municipal jurisdiction. All these variables bar roads are constructed from the 
micro-data of the Brazilian household census (Censo Demográfico).18 The length 
of roads under municipal jurisdiction is constructed by us from administrative 
 
18
 Residential-capital values are based on Census data on housing characteristics and location, which are then converted 
into Reais through a hedonic model. The number of rooms is the total number of rooms, not just bedrooms. We also note 
for readers unfamiliar with Brazilian data that the Brazilian “census” is really a representative sample covering 
approximately 12% of the population. 
records.  
Our focal IV results in levels for individual outcomes are statistically 
indistinguishable from 0 at standard confidence levels in five cases. Of the 
remaining outcomes, the percent of people not living in favelas and the kilometers 
of paved roads have statistically significantly negative coefficients, at the 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Only the fraction of households that benefit from garbage 
collection appear to be positively affected by oil revenues. When we look at the 
“family out outcomes” we get a significantly negative effect, indicating that, 
overall, oil-related revenues destroy public good and service provision. As seen 
from panel D, these estimates in levels appear to be a best-case scenario for the 
effects of oil: in first differences the coefficient on garbage collection turns from 
positive to significantly negative, and the coefficient on households with sewage 
connection turns from insignificant to significantly negative. 
In Table 7 we look at actual inputs into education (number of teachers and of 
classrooms, both in 2000 and 2005) and health (hospitals and clinics in 2002), and 
certain transfers received by households in 2000 (these include transfers for the 
alleviation of poverty, unemployment benefits, and incentives for schooling for 
poor families).19 
The results on education are slightly more encouraging than those for housing 
and road networks. While there is no statistically significant effect on outcomes in 
2000 (columns 1 and 2), in our benchmark IV specification in levels larger oil-
related revenues appear to be associated with increases in municipal teachers and 
classrooms in 2005 (columns 3 and 4). The point estimate implies that a million 
Reais of extra revenue in 2000 is associated with the hiring of 3 teachers and the 
construction of 2 classrooms in 2005. There may therefore be some real benefits 
from oil in the sphere of education, though unfortunately as can be seen from 
 
19
 For the first-difference specification we use 1992 and 1996 as our base years for health and education variables since 
those are the earliest years for which we have outcomes comparable to those in our later year of data. 
panel D these results are not robust to first differencing. 
In columns 5 and 6 we look at municipal health infrastructure. In our 
benchmark level-IV specification there is no statistically significant effect on 
either hospitals (column 5), or clinics (column 6), though the coefficient on the 
latter turns positive in first differences.  
Finally, in column 7 we look at the effect of oil-related revenues on poverty- 
and unemployment-related social transfers from the population census. Since we 
have no baseline we have the level effect only. There is no indication that these 
welfare-like payments increase with oil revenues (the pint estimate is actually 
negative).  
Overall, we estimate a statistically positive “family of outcome” effect, which 
is clearly driven by the education outcomes (though only in the specifications in 
levels). In other areas, the reported spending of the oil revenues continues to 
appear to have gone missing. 
Taken together, the results from Tables 5, 6 and 7 are potentially troubling. 
Reported spending on housing, transportation, education, health, and social 
transfers all respond strongly to revenues from oil, but when we look at indicators 
of real outcomes in these areas we find effects that seem extremely small 
compared to the reported budget items. The possible exceptions are in garbage 
collection and education, where some benefits from oil do appear to materialize. 
 
D. Limitations of the Results on Public Service Provisions 
We now discuss two important issues concerning the conclusions we have just 
drawn.  
(i) Time to build. A possible concern with our results is that we fail 
to identify positive effects because spending produces benefits 
only with some lag. For example some of the spending is directed 
at infrastructure projects and these may take a few years to 
complete. The comparison between columns 1-2 and 3-4 of Table 
7 lends some credence to this view, where outcomes seem to 
respond more strongly when a lag is allowed for. In assessing the 
importance of this concern a number of considerations are 
relevant. First, only some of our outcome variables are plausibly 
subject to “time to build.” In particular, there is no great delay 
needed to hire teachers or mail transfer payments to households. 
Second, there is no effect whatever of spending in 2000 on 
municipal roads in 2005, even though transportation is one of the 
significant winners from oil revenues in the reported spending. If 
anything the effect is negative. Third, it is important to keep in 
mind that municipal revenues from oil are persistent over time. 
AMCs with relatively large revenues in 2000 tend to have had 
relatively large revenues for several years, so our coefficients 
should not necessarily be interpreted as measuring the impact 
effect of contemporaneous revenues. Rather, they should be 
thought of as capturing the cumulated effects of several-year 
worth of Petro-Reais. To make this point more concrete, in the 
Appendix we present an attempt to estimate cumulative municipal 
revenues since 1991 associated with one Real worth of oil 
production in 2000. In performing this calculation we make 
conservative assumptions, and our estimates are almost certainly 
downward biased. Still, we find this lower bound to be in the 
order of at least 6 cents, namely double the “flow” coefficient for 
2000 we reported in Table 4. This confirms that municipalities 
receiving oil-related revenues in 2000 had been doing so in 
previous years as well. 
(ii) Crowding out of state and federal spending. The items in the state 
and federal functional spending budget are essentially the same as 
in the municipal budget, and the “division of labor” between 
different levels of government in Brazil is blurred. It is therefore 
conceivable that state and federal bodies withdraw funding in 
areas where they are aware of increased spending by municipal 
governments. We can rule out this concern in the areas of 
education, health, and transportation, because our road, teacher, 
classroom, and health establishment variables explicitly refer to 
provision by municipal governments only. They are therefore net 
of state and federal contributions, and as such not subject to 
crowding out.20 Still, it is interesting to see if federal and state 
provision in these areas responds to municipal oil revenues. We 
investigate this question in appendix Table A3, and we find that 
state- and federally-provided goods and services are generally 
unaffected by oil-related municipal revenues.21 In the same table 
we also show that there is no crowding out in the value of federal 
 
20
 There are federal and state transfers to municipalities earmarked for education, health, and road construction, but 
crucially these transfers show up as revenues in the municipal budget, as well as spending items in the corresponding 
functional categories (we have confirmed this in private communications with a Brazilian fiscal expert). But now recall that 
we observe both revenues and reported spending increasing with oil, so crowding out of these transfers cannot be the 
explanation for our results. 
21
 The only exception is that oil output decreases the change in federal and state clinics per capita, but even this change 
is not significant in our main (cross-section) specification. Litschig (2008) also looks at whether fiscal windfalls due to 
discontinuities in the allocation formula for federal transfers crowd out other sources of revenues, and finds no evidence of 
this. 
contracts, which are individually negotiated deals between the 
mayor and the federal government to finance specific projects.22 
 
E. Oil Abundance and Household Income 
The results so far generate some questions as to the extent to which the 
reported spending increases actually materialize in services to the population. 
Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that the population benefits from the 
government’s expansion of the budget in ways that are not directly captured by 
our indicators of public-good provision. Hence, in Table 8 we study the effect of 
oil-induced government revenue on a summary measure of living standards: 
namely household income per capita, which we compute from the Brazilian 
census. 
Column (1) shows that there is no significant effect on average household 
income whatever in the IV regressions. These results suggest that the reported 
expansion in the government budget has not lead to aggregate increases in living 
standards that we have somehow missed in the previous section.23 In the next five 
columns we look at the effect of oil on average income within each quintile of the 
household income distribution. This gives a somewhat more nuanced view than 
looking at the average effect. In particular, we do find some evidence that 
household income increases in the bottom quintile of the income distribution.24 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that these increases are small: for every per-
 
22
 We are grateful to Fred Finan for alerting us of this issue and making this data available to us. 
23
 Note that there is no contradiction between the positive coefficients on GDP per capita, an output measure, in Table 
3 and the zero coefficient on average income in Table 8. In an open economy output and income can be very different as 
factor payments may flow to agents residing outside the municipality. In this particular case, the value added of the 
oilfields is distributed to rig workers (typically international highly-skilled professionals residing in major Brazilian 
metropolitan areas, if not abroad), and to the shareholders of Petrobras, an equally international group. 
24
 At the 10% significance level in the specification in levels and at the 5% level in the specification in changes. 
capita Real of increased revenue (and spending), the increase in income is in the 
order of ten cents. To benchmark this number, consider this: suppose the 
government mechanically rebated each Real of oil-related income to all 
households in the municipality equally (and there were no additional general 
equilibrium effects). Then all five of the coefficients in columns (2)-(6) should 
simultaneously be 1. In the last column of Table 8 we look at the effect of oil on 
poverty rates. In levels, there is no statistical evidence of a decline in poverty 
associated with extra oil-related revenues.25 
 
IV. Interpretation and Discussion 
Our results suggest that some of the revenues from oil disappear before 
turning into the real goods and services they are supposed to be used for. Where is 
this missing money going?  
The decision on how to allocate oil revenues rests with the agent, or group of 
agents, with executive control over the windfall. In the context of Brazilian 
municipalities this tends to be the group formed by the mayor and his or her close 
associates (including some members of the local legislature). In allocating this 
revenue, the mayor and his associates have essentially three broad options.26 The 
first category is the provision of public goods and services, but as we have seen 
the mayors do not seem to make much use of this option.27 Our findings in this 
respect are echoed in Monteiro and Ferraz (2010), who examine the effect of oil 
 
25
 There is a significant reduction in poverty in the first-difference specification, though the point estimate implies 
minuscule effects. Municipal revenues due to oil need to increase by 100 Reais per capita to see a reduction in poverty of 
0.67 of one percentage point. This is more than the average revenue from oil royalties in the oil abundant sample (see 
Table 1). 
26
 The working paper presents a simple formal model of the mayor’s decision problem. See also Caselli and 
Cunningham (2009). 
27
 In principle other “benign” possibilities include lowering taxes and increasing municipal saving, but our results show 
that neither is very relevant in the Brazilian municipal context. 
royalties on political outcomes in Brazilian municipalities.28 Like us, they 
conclude that oil windfalls did not significantly improve public good provision. 
The second category may be termed “patronage,” or rent sharing, and covers 
unproductive uses of public revenues through which the mayor favors certain 
groups, typically with the goal of improving his chances of re-election.29 This 
could take the form of increased public-sector wages, or creating fictitious jobs, 
where the “workers” receive wages without delivering the corresponding 
(meaningful) amount of labour services. The interpretation that (at least some of) 
the money is used this way is consistent with our findings that oil increases 
municipal spending on a broad range of categories. It is also consistent with 
Monteiro and Ferraz (2010), who find that oil windfalls lead to large increases in 
government payrolls (though not in individual workers’ wages) and, at least in the 
short run, higher reelection rates for incumbents. 
The third category of uses for the fiscal windfall is embezzlement, or outright 
stealing of the municipal revenues. Embezzled funds in turn could either be used 
for re-election purposes, through vote buying, corrupting the media to provide 
favorable coverage, etc., or could simply be used to finance personal wealth 
accumulation.30 Consistent with this view, the working-paper version of this paper 
shows that mayors of municipalities that produce large absolute amounts of oil are 
more likely to be quoted in the news media in stories involving corruption, and to 
be investigated for corruption by the federal police. This evidence is 
circumstantial, but it is consistent with the view that embezzlement accounts for 
 
28
 Our reasons for using oil output, rather than oil royalties, as the regressor of interest, are explained  in Sections I and 
II. 
29
 See Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2002), and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), for models emphasizing 
patronage as a source of votes for the incumbent. 
30
 Increased spending on re-election efforts may not be just due to more resources available for the purpose. It could 
also be that the presence of a windfall increases competition for top municipal jobs, forcing incumbents to divert and spend 
more. Contributions emphasizing increased power struggles following resource windfalls include Tornell and Lane (1999), 
Ross (2001a, 2001b, 2006), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006a, 2006b), and Caselli and Coleman (2008). 
part of the missing money.31 
As an informal check on the nature of the allegations behind news stories and 
federal police operations, we made a broader search of the news on the 10 most 
oil-rich municipalities (by oil output in 2000). Some of the stories are summarized 
in Appendix Table A4, and they appear to indicate that corruption in oil-rich 
municipalities is a serious concern. One of the stories relates to “Operação 
Telhado De Vidro” (“Operation Glass Ceiling”) in the municipality of Campos 
dos Goytacazes, the largest oil producer in 2000. In March 2008, a large number 
of local-government officials at the highest level were accused of diverting the 
equivalent of 140 million dollars. This is larger than the average municipality’s 
annual budget, though still only a fraction of the royalties received by Campos 
dos Goytacazes over the past decade.  
Taken together, the evidence leads us to conclude that the missing money 
result is explained by a combination of patronage spending/rent sharing and 
embezzlement. 
A particularly important question for future research is whether and to what 
extent the implications of fiscal windfalls from natural resources are different 
from other types of windfalls, such as foreign aid or federal transfers, and – if so – 
why.32 Our  results on health, education and household income tend to paint to a 
more beneficial picture of the uses of general revenues relative to oil-related 
revenues, as the OLS coefficients are almost uniformly larger than the IV ones 
(Tables 7 and 8). This suggests that oil-related revenues tend to go missing more 
easily than general revenues. One caveat to this conclusion is that general 
revenues appear to be as ineffective as oil revenues in the area of infrastructure 
 
31
 In order to embezzle the funds the group around the mayor could use various techniques. For example the mayor can 
award fictitious public-procurement contracts to close associates who will then rebate (most of) the money back to him. 
32
 Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) argue with cross-country data that resources corrupt more than aid. 
and housing (Table 6).33 
Should there be a systematic difference in the effects of natural-resource based 
revenues vis-à-vis other types of fiscal revenues we think the most likely 
explanation would have to do with voter ignorance. Observing and estimating 
royalty income may be harder than forming an idea of the likely magnitude of 
other types of incomes.34 There is some circumstantial evidence that the general 
public is ill informed about the magnitude of the oil-related fiscal windfall. In 
Campos dos Goytacazes, mentioned above as the largest oil producer of Brazil, 
the local news bulletin “Petróleo, Royalties & Região” conducted surveys to 
assess the local population’s knowledge about oil royalties. In May 2004 
respondents chose a range of values for the monthly fiscal receipts due to oil. 66% 
of respondents underestimated, i.e. picked a range below the “correct” interval of 
R$20m to R$50m. Only 15% overestimated.35  
 
V. Conclusions 
Oil production generates significant increases in municipal revenues. These 
windfalls are matched by reported spending increases, particularly in urban 
infrastructure and housing, education, health services, and transfers. However, 
improvements in various areas of public-service provision appear small compared 
to the corresponding reported spending increases. Furthermore, increases in 
 
33
 Another caveat, as already discussed, is that the larger OLS coefficients may reflect endogeneity bias, though recall 
that the results in Table 5 provide some circumstantial support for a causal interpretation.  
34
 Of course this does not imply that other types of income are observed perfectly, nor that there should be zero 
corruption from other sources. Indeed Brollo et al. (2010) also explain their finding that federal transfers increase 
corruption with imperfect information of voters. 
35
http://www.royaltiesdopetroleo.ucam-campos.br/index.php?cod=1. Incidentally this quarterly bulletin is a very 
interesting window on the concerns raised locally by the oil windfall. Recurrent themes are the lack of transparency in the 
utilization of the royalties, and the perceived ineffectiveness of royalty money in promoting development and living 
standards. The September 2004 issue pointedly reports that one year of royalty money would be enough to build 18,890 
social housing units (casa populares) or pay for a presidential election campaign. 
household income are modest-to-undetectable. There is suggestive evidence that 
some of the “missing money” is accounted for by embezzlement.  
These findings suggest that incumbent mayors are able to divert the majority of 
the oil revenues that accrue to the municipality. The diverted funds may be 
allocated to a combination of self-enrichment and vote buying. 
Specific to the Brazilian context, our findings may imply that oil-rich 
municipalities should be given special consideration in the current trend towards 
greater decentralization (Lipscomb and Mobarak 2007) and in the design of audit 
schemes aimed at curbing corruption (Ferraz and Finan 2008a, 2008b). This 
special focus may become even more important following the recent discovery of 
huge new offshore fields. Indeed, the issue is of massive current political 
relevance, as the government has recently proposed a radical reform of the royalty 
regime, creating a major political faultline in national politics. 
 
APPENDIX: A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF CUMULATIVE OIL-RELATED 
REVENUES OVER THE 1990S 
      In order to estimate the cumulative revenues associated with oil production 
in 2000 we run a set of regressions of municipal revenues in each preceding year 
on oil output in 2000. We have done this already in Table 4 for 1991 and 2000, 
but we repeat this for every intervening year. The cumulative effect of one Real of 
oil in 2000 on revenues between 1991 and 2000 should be the sum of all these 
coefficients. The results are in Unpublished Appendix 3. Unfortunately, the 
municipal-level data on total revenues suffer from unacceptably high numbers of 
missing values in 1998 and 1999. In each of these two years, 25% of the AMCs in 
the offshore oil sample fail to report municipal revenues, so we can’t put any store 
on the coefficients from these two years. We do have, separately, municipal 
royalties in 1999 (with no missing values). Hence, as a partial remedy to the 
“hole” for that year we can regress 1999 royalties on 2000 oil output. We get a 
coefficient of 0.0100 (s.e. 0.0013). To construct a lower-bound estimate of 
cumulative revenues between 1991 and 2000 we do the following (i) sum over the 
statistically significant coefficients of revenues on 2000 output (these are 1991-
1995, and 2000); (ii) add 0.01 for 1999 from the royalty regression. This gives 
0.0638, i.e. roughly double the flow estimate for 2000. 
       It is important to highlight the reasons why this is a lower bound. First, we 
have treated the two insignificant estimates in 1996 and 1997 as zeros, even 
though at least the 1996 figure is borderline significant. Second, we have assumed 
a zero coefficient for 1998, just because the sample size is too small for revenues 
and we have no royalty data at the municipal level. Third, we have used the 
coefficients for royalties in 1999, but recall from Table 4 that in 2000 the 
coefficient on royalties is only about two-thirds than the coefficient on total 
revenues. 
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TABLE 1— SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BRAZILIAN AMCS 
(1) (2) 
Coastal 
AMCs 
without 
oil 
Coastal 
AMCs with 
offshore oil 
only 
GDP per capita in 2002 (Brazilian R$2000) 3,934 8,058 
Municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 444 699 
Population in 2000 161,784 93,372 
Latitude -13.3 -17.8 
Longitude 42.0 42.1 
Distance to the federal capital (kilometers) 1,401 1,180 
State capital dummy 0.051 0.032 
Distance to the state capital (kilometers) 106.1 99.2 
0 3,894 
Mean oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 
90th percentile of oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 6,949 
95th percentile of oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 21,319 
Maximum oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 45,221 
Observations (AMCs) 156 31 
Notes: Each AMC includes one municipality or multiple municipalities. In all tables "Oil" denotes both oil and 
natural gas. All values reported are means, unless otherwise specified. Municipal revenues in 2000 are only 
available for 3,242 out of a total of 3,659 AMCs. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 2— TESTS OF CONDITIONAL RANDOM ASSIGNMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Average 
years of 
schooling 
among 
people 
aged 25 
and over 
Fractio
n 
literate 
among 
people 
aged 
15 and 
over 
Residen
tial 
capital 
per 
capita 
Percent of 
household
s with 
electric 
lighting 
Percent of 
household
s with 
toilets 
linked to 
main 
network 
Percent of 
household
s with 
water 
linked to 
main 
network 
Total 
effect on 
family of 
outcomes 
Oil 
output 
per 
capita 
in 
2000 -0.031 -0.004 -0.033 -0.023 -0.116 0.016 0.093 -0.024 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.154) (0.025) (0.286) (0.245) (0.238) (0.075) 
Obs. 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient from a regression using a cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes 
one municipality or more). The sample includes coastal AMCs without oil and coastal AMCs with offshore oil 
only. All values are in thousands of Brazilian R$2000. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast 
dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  
 
TABLE 3— THE EFFECT OF OIL OUTPUT PER CAPITA ON GDP PER CAPITA, BY SECTOR (2002) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: GDP Per Capita 
GDP Per Capita in 
Industry 
GDP Per Capita in Non-
Industry 
Oil output per capita 0.380 0.374 0.006 
(0.024) (0.007) (0.018) 
Observations (AMCs) 187 187 187 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient from a regression using a cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes 
one municipality or multiple municipalities) in 2002. The sample includes coastal AMCs without oil and coastal 
AMCs with offshore oil only. Industry includes manufacturing, mineral extraction, civilian construction, and 
public utilities. The calculation of GDP in industry (and total GDP) from oil changed in 2002 - see paper for 
details. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state 
capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
 
TABLE 4— EFFECT OF OIL OUTPUT PER CAPITA ON MUNICIPALITY REVENUES PER CAPITA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total 
municipal 
revenues 
per capita 
in 2000 
Total municipal 
revenues per 
capita in 2000 (see 
footnote) 
Royalties 
from oil in 
2000 (only 
AMCs in 
column 2) 
Change in total 
municipal revenues 
per capita from 
1991-2000 (see 
footnote) 
Oil output per capita in 2000 0.0334 0.0334 0.0178 0.0311 
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0031) 
Observations (AMCs) 153 176 176 175 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficients on Oil Output per Capita in 2000 from a regression using a cross 
section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or multiple municipalities). The sample includes 
coastal AMCs without oil and coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. Since 
we only have municipal revenues for about 91 percent of the AMCs in 2000, columns (2), (3), and (4) predict 
2000 municipal revenues from 2001 municipal revenues using a linear regression to complete missing 2000 
values. Similarly, in column (4) we use 1992 municipal revenues to predict missing 1991 values. All 
regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, 
distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
 
TABLE 5—THE EFFECT OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES FROM OIL ON MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Functional expenditures 
Education 
and 
Culture 
Health and 
Sanitation 
Housing and 
urban 
development Transportation 
Social 
Transfers Total 
Levels in 2000 
A: OLS 0.217 0.118 0.129 0.073 0.053 0.827 
(0.024) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.032) 
B: IV 0.138 0.106 0.178 0.125 0.054 0.818 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.007) (0.025) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from 1991-2000 
C: OLS 0.207 0.098 0.116 0.077 0.052 0.782 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.039) 
D: IV 0.147 0.105 0.173 0.117 0.052 0.823 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.007) (0.033) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 174 174 174 174 174 174 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 from a regression using a 
cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). The dependent variables are measured 
in 2000 in Panels A and B and in changes from 1991-2000 in Panels C and D. Panels A and C report OLS 
coefficients, while Panels B and D report IV coefficients using oil output per capita in 2000 as an instrument. 
The sample includes all coastal AMCs without oil and all coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in 
Brazilian R$2000. Missing 2000 (1991) revenues were predicted using 2001 (1992) values and a linear 
regression. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the 
state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
TABLE 6— THE EFFECT OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES FROM OIL ON HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE (PART 1 OF 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Per capita 
residential 
capital 
Rooms at home 
per 1000 people 
aged 16-64 
Percent of 
population not 
living in 
favelas 
Percent of 
population 
living in 
housing with 
electricity 
Percent of 
population living 
in housing with 
garbage collection 
Levels in 2000 (except column 9, which is measured in 2005) 
A: OLS -0.00003 0.096 -0.0031 0.0021 0.0077 
(0.00058) (0.075) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0028) 
B: IV -0.00141 0.086 -0.0141 0.0026 0.0120 
(0.00102) (0.122) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0048) 
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from 1991-2000 
C: OLS -0.00044 -0.067 -0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0080 
(0.00039) (0.083) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0042) 
D: IV -0.00061 -0.217 -0.0044 -0.0022 -0.0212 
(0.00048) (0.131) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0098) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 
 
TABLE 6— THE EFFECT OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES FROM OIL ON HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE (PART 2 OF 2) 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percent of 
population 
living in 
housing with 
piped water 
Percent of 
households 
receiving water 
from the main 
network 
Percent of 
households 
with toilets 
linked to the 
main network 
Kilometers of 
paved roads 
under 
municipal 
jurisdiction 
per million 
people 
Total effect on 
family of 
outcomes 
Levels in 2000 (except column 9, which is measured in 2005) 
A: OLS -0.0019 -0.0075 0.0004 -0.004 -0.0013 
(0.0049) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.006) (0.0017) 
B: IV 0.0050 -0.0020 0.0030 -0.013 -0.0063 
(0.0032) (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.007) (0.0020) 
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from 1991-2000 
A: OLS 0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0077 -0.0026 
(0.0033) (0.0071) (0.0038) (0.0015) 
B: IV 0.0012 -0.0065 -0.0122 -0.0061 
(0.0025) (0.0074) (0.0033) (0.0008) 
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 from a regression using a 
cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). The dependent variables are measured 
in levels in Panels A and B and in changes in Panels C and D. Panels A and C report OLS coefficients, while 
Panels B and D report IV coefficients using oil output per capita in 2000 as an instrument. The sample includes 
all coastal AMCs without oil and all coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. 
Missing 2000 (1991) revenues were predicted using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions 
control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the 
federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 7—THE EFFECT OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES FROM OIL ON EDUCATION, HEALTH & TRANSFERS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Municipal:   
teachers 
per 
million 
people 
classrooms 
per million 
people 
teachers 
per 
million 
people 
classrooms 
per million 
people 
hospitals 
per 
million 
people 
clinics 
per 
million 
people 
Social 
transfer
s per 
capita 
Total 
effect on 
family of 
outcomes 
Levels in: 
2000 2000 2005 2005 2002 2002 2000   
A: 
OLS 5.3 3.0 6.0 3.2 0.053 0.147 0.004 0.0067 
(1.5) (0.8) (1.7) (0.8) (0.042) (0.059) (0.004) (0.0017) 
B: 
IV 1.2 0.9 3.1 1.9 0.002 0.129 -0.002 0.0027 
(1.1) (0.7) (1.3) (0.7) (0.005) (0.083) (0.001) (0.0013) 
Obs. 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from: 
1996-
2000 1996-2000 
1996-
2005 1996-2005  
1992-
2002  
1992-
2002     
C: 
OLS 1.9 1.1 3.1 1.6 0.042 0.145 0.0043 
(1.7) (0.8) (2.3) (0.9) (0.052) (0.070) (0.0022) 
D: 
IV -0.9 0.0 1.2 1.1 0.009 0.187 0.0014 
(1.1) (0.6) (1.5) (0.8) (0.008) (0.073) (0.0015) 
Obs. 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 from a regression using a 
cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). The dependent variables are measured 
in levels in Panels A and B and in changes in Panels C and D. Panels A and C report OLS coefficients, while 
Panels B and D report IV coefficients using oil output per capita in 2000 as an instrument. The sample includes 
all coastal AMCs without oil and all coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. 
Missing 2000 (1991) revenues were predicted using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. For 
municipalities that did not report health establishments, we assumed that there were no health establishments. 
All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, 
distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
 
TABLE 8—THE EFFECT OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES FROM OIL ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Per capita 
household 
income 
Per capita 
household 
income: 
1st 
(=bottom) 
quintile 
Per capita 
household 
income: 
2nd 
quintile 
Per capita 
household 
income: 
3rd 
quintile 
Per capita 
household 
income: 
4th 
quintile 
Per capita 
household 
income: 
5th 
quintile 
Percent 
poor 
Levels in 2000 
A: OLS 0.727 0.088 0.147 0.288 0.639 2.677 -0.0028 
(0.317) (0.036) (0.074) (0.132) (0.289) (1.122) (0.0026) 
B: IV -0.038 0.086 0.037 -0.034 -0.173 -0.136 -0.0042 
(0.488) (0.045) (0.117) (0.244) (0.526) (1.544) (0.0036) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from 1991-2000 
C: OLS 0.390 0.077 0.089 0.156 0.402 1.411 0.0000 
(0.191) (0.035) (0.055) (0.085) (0.167) (0.714) (0.0028) 
D: IV 0.112 0.100 0.108 0.091 0.114 0.122 -0.0067 
(0.310) (0.039) (0.069) (0.150) (0.309) (1.042) (0.0027) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 from a regression using a 
cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). The dependent variables are measured 
in levels in Panels A and B and in changes in Panels C and D. Panels A and C report OLS coefficients, while 
Panels B and D report IV coefficients using oil output per capita in 2000 as an instrument. The sample includes 
all coastal AMCs without oil and all coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. 
Missing 2000 (1991) revenues were predicted using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions 
control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the 
federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
 
TABLE A1— EXTENDED SUMMARY STATISTICS (PART 1 OF 2) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
GDP per capita in 2002 4,617.8 4,565.8 
Total municipal revenues per capita in 2000 492.5 324.9 
Population in 2000 150,443.3 484,869.6 
Latitude -14.0 9.9 
Longitude 42.0 5.3 
Distance to the federal capital (kilometers) 1,364.1 333.7 
State capital dummy 0.0 0.2 
Distance to the state capital (kilometers) 105.0 103.4 
Oil output per capita in 2000 645.5 3,937.1 
Average years of schooling among people aged 25 and over in 1970 1,665.7 1,563.1 
Fraction literate among people aged 15 and over in 1970 1.6 1.0 
Residential capital per capita in 1970 55.8 18.2 
Percent of households with electric lighting in 1970 2.1 1.9 
Percent of households with toilets linked to main network in 1970 28.1 25.2 
Percent of households with water linked to main network in 1970 3.2 9.9 
GDP per capita in 1970 16.6 22.0 
GDP per capita in industry in 2002 1,214.2 2,624.5 
GDP per capita in non-industry in 2002 3,403.6 2,860.2 
Total municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (missing values predicted as in Table 4) 465.3 312.5 
Royalties from oil in 2000 18.9 87.2 
Municipal functional expenditures  per capita on education and culture in 2000 129.1 75.1 
Municipal functional expenditures  per capita on health and sanitation in 2000 70.8 56.8 
Municipal functional expenditures  per capita on housing and urban development in 
2000 53.7 64.8 
Municipal functional expenditures  per capita on transportation in 2000 23.5 40.5 
Municipal functional expenditures  per capita on social transfers in 2000 24.0 27.6 
Total municipal functional expenditures  per capita in 2000 426.3 284.0 
Per capita residential capital in 2000 4.5 3.5 
Rooms at home per 1000 people aged 16-64 in 2000 5,406.1 640.8 
Percent of population not living in favelas in 2000 98.4 5.1 
Percent of population living in housing with electricity in 2000 89.6 14.1 
Percent of population living in housing with garbage collection in 2000 75.6 27.1 
Percent of population living in housing with piped water in 2000 66.5 29.1 
Percent of households receiving water from the main network in 2000 60.7 25.4 
Percent of households with toilets linked to the main network in 2000 16.0 20.3 
Notes: This is part 1 of a table that reports means and standard deviations of the variables for the sample, which 
includes coastal AMCs without oil and coastal AMCs with offshore oil only (187 AMCs in total). 
  
 
TABLE A1— EXTENDED SUMMARY STATISTICS (PART 2 OF 2) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Kilometers of paved roads under municipal jurisdiction per million people in 2005 5.8 21.9 
Municipal teachers per million people in 2000 7,678.8 3,599.3 
Municipal classrooms per million people in 2000 4,168.6 2,236.3 
Municipal teachers per million people in 2005 8,999.7 4,575.5 
Municipal classrooms per million people in 2005 4,506.2 2,445.2 
Municipal hospitals per million people in 2002 15.0 42.4 
Municipal clinics per million people in 2002 308.4 221.8 
Social transfers per capita in 2000 8.8 7.5 
Per capita household income in 2000 2,331.3 1,684.4 
Per capita household income: 1st (=bottom) quintile in 2000 288.1 238.1 
Per capita household income: 2nd quintile in 2000 763.0 524.9 
Per capita household income: 3rd quintile in 2000 1,265.0 875.5 
Per capita household income: 4th quintile in 2000 2,138.6 1,585.9 
Per capita household income: 5th quintile in 2000 7,185.6 5,386.2 
Percent poor in 2000 47.5 24.2 
Log population in 1970 10.0 1.3 
Log population in 1980 10.2 1.3 
Log population in 1991 10.5 1.3 
Log population in 1996 10.6 1.4 
Log population in 2000 10.8 1.4 
Log population in 2005 10.9 1.4 
Population in 1970 76,789.0 331,061.0 
Population in 1980 101,062.3 402,278.1 
Population in 1991 126,724.8 444,744.6 
Population in 1996 136,837.5 456,864.0 
Population in 2005 171,930.3 529,130.9 
Fed. and State teachers per million people in 2000 4,300.9 2,412.6 
Fed. and State classrooms per million people in 2000 1,781.3 1,092.4 
Fed. and State teachers per million people in 2005 3,852.8 2,197.9 
Fed. and State classrooms per million people in 2005 1,578.5 1,000.5 
Fed. and State hospitals per million people in 2002 2.6 7.5 
Fed. and State clinics per million people in 2002 5.3 23.8 
Km. of paved roads under non-municipal jurisdiction per million people in 2005 1.87E+09 2.47E+09 
Value of Fed. contracts per capita in 2000 28.3 70.7 
Notes: This is part 2 of a table that reports means and standard deviations of the variables for the sample, which 
includes coastal AMCs without oil and coastal AMCs with offshore oil only (187 AMCs in total). 
  
 
 
TABLE A2— NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT OF OIL ON POPULATION 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2005 
A: Dependent variable: 
1,000,000 x ln(population) 
       
Oil output per capita in 2000 -26.2 -26.7 -22.1 -17.9 -18.3 -18.4 
(14.3) (13.8) (13.6) (12.8) (12.1) (11.4) 
    
B: Dependent variable: 
population 
       
Oil output per capita in 2000 -8.5 -10.7 -11.5 -11.5 -12.1 -13.1 
(6.3) (7.5) (7.9) (7.9) (8.2) (8.9) 
Observations (AMCs) 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on oil output per capita in 2000 from an OLS regression using a cross 
section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). Panel A uses log population as outcomes, 
while Panel B uses population in levels as outcomes. The sample includes all coastal AMCs without oil and all 
coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. All regressions control for latitude, 
longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and 
state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
  
TABLE A3— TEST FOR CROWDING OUT OF STATE AND FEDERAL INVESTMENTS (PART 1 OF 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Federal and 
state teachers 
per million 
people 
Federal and 
state 
classrooms per 
million people 
Federal and 
state teachers 
per million 
people 
Federal and 
state 
classrooms per 
million people 
Federal and 
state hospitals 
per million 
people 
Levels in: 
2000 2000 2005 2005 2002 
A: OLS -1.2 -0.5 -1.2 -0.4 0.000 
(0.6) (0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.002) 
B: IV 1.2 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.005 
(0.9) (0.3) (0.8) (0.3) (0.004) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 176 176 176 176 176 
Changes from: 
1996-2000 1996-2000 1996-2005 1996-2005 1992-2002   
C: OLS -1.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.005 
(0.5) (0.2) (0.5) (0.3) (0.008) 
D: IV -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 -0.003 
(0.6) (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.005) 
Observations 
(AMCs) 175 175 175 175 175 
 
  
 
TABLE A3— TEST FOR CROWDING OUT OF STATE AND FEDERAL INVESTMENTS (PART 2 OF 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Federal and state 
clinics per million 
people 
Kilometers of 
paved roads under 
non-municipal 
jurisdiction per 
million people 
Value of federal 
contracts per 
capita 
Total effect on 
family of 
outcomes 
 Levels in:  
2002 2005 2000 
A: OLS -0.004 2.5 0.0105 -0.0010 
(0.004) (1.7) (0.0145) (0.0006) 
B: IV -0.014 0.8 -0.0225 0.0001 
(0.010) (0.7) (0.0171) (0.0011) 
Observations (AMCs) 176 176 176 176 
 Changes from:    
1992-2002   
C: OLS -0.251 -0.0029 
(0.137) (0.0011) 
D: IV -0.096 -0.0019 
(0.034) (0.0014) 
Observations (AMCs) 175 175 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 from a regression using a 
cross-section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). The dependent variables are measured 
in levels in Panels A and B and in changes in Panels C and D. Panels A and C report OLS coefficients, while 
Panels B and D report IV coefficients using oil output per capita in 2000 as an instrument. The sample includes 
all coastal AMCs without oil and all coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. 
Missing 2000 (1991) revenues were predicted using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. For 
municipalities that did not report health establishments, we assumed that there were no health establishments. 
All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, 
distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. We have no data 
on roads or federal contracts for 1991. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
TABLE A4— NEWS ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION AND FRAUD IN OIL-RICH MUNICIPALITIES 
Rank 
(Oil 
Output 
in 
2000) 
Rank 
(Per 
Capita 
Oil 
Output 
in 
2000) Municipality Event 
Authority 
involved 
Amount 
involved Source 
1 4 Campos dos 
Goytacazes 
Mayor removed from office 
and several associates arrested 
in a case involving fraud in 
bidding and illegal hiring in 
the city council. 
Federal 
Police 
Operation 
"Telhado 
de Vidro" 
Up to 
R$240 
million 
O Globo, 
O Dia 
Online 
3 12 Macaé State prosecution took legal 
action against the mayor 
between 1988-2004, who is 
accused of misusing public 
funds and participating in a 
scheme directing biddings for 
contracts of municipal works. 
Prosecution 
of the State 
of Rio de 
Janerio 
Not 
specified 
Gazetta 
Mercantil 
" " " Re-elected mayor and ex-
mayor accused of dishonest 
administration and cheating in 
bidding of school lunches. 
Federal 
Public 
Prosecution 
R$ 1.5 
million 
Agencia 
Brasil  
5 20 Cabo Frio Former mayor and current 
senior municipal employee 
exchange allegations regarding 
an investigation by the federal 
police that targeted the 
municipality (among other 
municipalities). 
Federal 
Police 
Operation 
"Joao de 
Barra" 
R$700 
million 
(over 
many 
municipa
lities) 
Agencia 
Brasil, O 
Globo, 
Jornal do 
Brasil 
6 10 Coari Mayor and associates arrested 
amidst allegations of 
corruption and criminal 
organization, including 
directing bids, overbilling, and 
faking work to appropriate 
resources from the federal 
government and Petrobras for 
oil and gas exploration. 24 
hours later, the headquarters of 
the daily newspaper, which 
covered the case, was attacked 
by gunshots. 
Federal 
Police 
Operation 
"Vorax" 
Allegedly 
at least 
R$50 
million 
Agencia 
Brasil, 
Ultimo 
Sequndo, 
and a 
blog 
" " " Mayor accused by a federal 
prosecutor of fraudulently 
obtaining social security funds. 
Federal 
Public 
Prosecution 
Allegedly 
at least 
R$1.5 
million 
Agencia 
Brasil 
8 5 Armação de 
Búzios 
Mayor ordered to appear 
before the state court to 
explain irregularities in 
accounts. 
Court of the 
State of Rio 
de Janerio 
Not 
specified 
Amarribo 
(an 
NGO) 
9 3 Carapebus Two former mayors accused of 
corruption and fraud in bidding 
and were investigated as part 
of a federal police operation 
Federal 
Police 
Operation 
"Pasárgada
" 
Not 
specified 
O Globo 
Notes: This table lists journalistic accounts of events involving alleged fraud, corruption, and other illegal 
activities associated with mayors in municipalities that ranked in the top 10 in Brazil in total oil output in 2000. 
 
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF OILFIELDS DISCOVERED BY DECADE 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. AMCS (FROM 1970) AND OILFIELDS IN BRAZIL 
Notes: The size of the oilfields (in red) has been enlarged to improve legibility.  
  
  
APPENDIX FIGURE A1: FRISCH-WAUGH DIAGRAM OF FIRST STAGE 
Notes: Residuals from regressing each variable on same controls as in tables. The sample includes all coastal AMCs 
without oil and coastal AMCs with offshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000.  
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